## Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management

Protecting our Communities



## **Course Objectives**

Upon completing this course you should be able to:

- Explain the core concepts of threat assessment
- Identify Threat Assessment tools and resources
- Better understanding different types of threatening behavior
- Identify strategies for management of threatening behavior





#### What is Threat Assessment?

Threat Assessment is a prevention strategy that has been referred to as the "missing link" in violence prevention. It is the process of deliberately trying to connect the dots or data that paints the picture that someone is moving on a pathway towards an act of <u>Targeted Violence</u> **before** the act occurs.




## What is Targeted Violence?

Targeted violence refers to violence that is goal-directed, predatory, and focused towards a specific individual(s) (e.g., stalking, terrorism, sexual assault). Threat assessment is the process of gathering information in an effort to estimate the threat of violence posed by a person or group of persons.

Source: Dr. Mario Scalora, University of Nebraska Targeted Violence Research Team

## Spheres of Influence



## Legal Considerations




## Six Principles of Threat Assessment

- 1. Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and often times discernible, process of thinking and behavior.
- 2. Targeted violence stems from an interaction between the individual, the situation, the setting, and the target.
- 3. An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful threat assessment.
- 4. Effective threat assessment is based upon facts rather than characteristics or traits.
- 5. Threat assessment is guided by an integrated **systems** approach.
- 6. The central question in a threat assessment inquiry is whether a person *poses* a threat, not whether a person *made* a threat.

Source: US Secret Service

## Topography of Violence



Source: World Health Organization

## Workplace Violence



Type 1 – Criminal Activity
Includes violent acts by
criminals who have no other
connection with the workplace,
but enter to commit robbery or
another crime.



Type 2 - Customers/Clients
Includes violence directed at
employees by customers,
clients, patients, inmates, or
any others for whom an
services are provided.



Type 3 - Coworkers

Consists of acts
committed by a present or
former employee.



Type 4 – Domestic Violence
Includes violence committed in
the workplace by someone who
doesn't work there, but has a
personal relationship with an
employee - for example, an
abusive spouse or domestic
partner.

### Domestic Violence



**Type 1 - Physical** 

Includes physical injuries to the victim, pushing, shoving, hitting, kicking, etc.



**Type 2 - Emotional** 

Includes degrading the victim, making them feel as if they have no self worth.



Type 3 - Sexual
Includes unwanted sexual
assault and harassment.



Type 4 - Financial
Includes financial
restriction, or dominance
over the victim.



Type 5 - Psychological Includes threatening, intimidating, and other behaviors to cause the victim fear.

## Research – Active/Mass Shootings

A Concerning Dynamic – **Hyper focus on Mass /Active shootings** 

US Secret Service Report on Mass Shooting <a href="https://www.secretservice.gov/data/press/reports/USSS\_FY2019\_MAPS.pdf">https://www.secretservice.gov/data/press/reports/USSS\_FY2019\_MAPS.pdf</a>

FBI Report on Active Shooters in the United States from 2000-2018 <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-incidents-2000-2018.pdf/view">https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-incidents-2000-2018.pdf/view</a>

Mother Jones Mass Shooting Database (1982-2019) – 114 Mass Shootings <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map/">https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map/</a>

Everytown Mass Shooting Database (2009-2017) – 173 Mass Shootings

https://everytownresearch.org/reports/mass-shootings-analysis/

Peterson, J. & Densley, J. (2019, Aug. 4). We have studied every mass shooting since 1966. Here's what we've learned about the shooters. 150 Mass shootings <a href="https://www.theviolenceproject.org/mass-shooters">https://www.theviolenceproject.org/mass-shooters</a>

## Risk Factors




Two-thirds of the attackers (n = 18, 67%) experienced mental health symptoms prior to their attacks. The most common symptoms observed were related to depression and psychotic symptoms, such as paranoia, hallucinations, or delusions. Suicidal thoughts were also observed (see Table 1). Nearly half of the attackers (n = 12, 44%) had been diagnosed with, or treated for, a mental illness prior to their attacks.

Source: 2018 Secret Service Report on Mass Shootings

In a 2018 report on 63 active shooter assailants, the FBI found that just a quarter of them had been diagnosed with a mental illness. Out of that 25 percent, only three of the assailants had been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder.

Blaming mental illness for gun violence is simplistic, inaccurate — and prevents us from solving the problem – APA President August 9<sup>th</sup> 2019

NAMI, the <u>National Alliance on Mental Illness</u>, is deeply saddened by the tragic events that occurred over the weekend in Texas and Ohio. These mass shootings are far too common and impact every corner of our nation. Every time we experience a tragedy like this, people with mental illness are drawn into the conversation. The truth is that the vast majority of violence is not perpetrated by people with mental illness. Statements to the contrary only serve to perpetuate stigma and distract from the real issues.



Source: Corey L. M. Keyes, The Mental Health Continuum (2002)

On the evening of May 23, 2014, in Isla Vista, California, 22-year-old Elliot Rodger killed six people and injured fourteen others near the campus of University of California, Santa Barbara, before killing himself inside his vehicle.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hP-UwheFiis

## Theories - Frustration Aggression

If a goal is being blocked, people often become **frustrated**. If we're feeling very angry at the source of that **frustration**, we may become **aggressive**. The **frustration-aggression theory** states that **frustration** often leads to **aggressive** behavior. This **theory** was proposed by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mower, and Sears in 1939.

## Theories – Social Learning Theory

Aggression can be directly learned through operant conditioning, involving positive and negative reinforcement and punishment. Aggression can also be learned by the indirect mechanism of observational learning. Social learning theory maintains that children learn through a process of imitation. This theory was proposed by Albert Bandura in 1973

## Theories – General Aggression Model

The General Aggression Model (GAM) is a comprehensive, integrative, framework for understanding aggression. It considers the role of social, cognitive, personality, developmental, and biological factors on aggression. This theory was proposed by DeWall, C. N., & Anderson, C. A. in 2011

## Violence Warning Signs – Reid Meloy's TRAP -18


Pathway Fixation Identification Novel Aggression **Energy Burst** Leakage Directly Communicated Threat Last Resort Behavior

## Recognizing the Warning Signs




There is no single warning sign or trait of a person who will commit an act of violence, these are simply "Red Flags" to watch out for.

## The "Pathway" to Violence



## The Pathway – **Not** a Straight line

As an individual moves along a pathway to violence, that person may be influenced by a large number of factors. The individual's motivation will fluctuate, as will the emotional state. It is important to be aware of these fluctuations and assess the person's behavior over a period of time.



Pathway, Identification, and Last Resort are the proximal warning behaviors that separate attackers from non-attackers when we look at the cumulative studies so far.

Source: Ried Meloy



#### Source:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2019/08/21/neo-nazi-was-arrested-threatening-woman-saying-he-would-exterminate-hispanics-feds-say/

Eric Lin, 35, was arrested Friday in Seattle and charged with making threatening communications via Facebook toward one unidentified South Florida woman, who believed that Lin targeted her after meeting her at a restaurant she worked at in Miami.

Pathway: reportedly sent more than 150 pages of threatening messages to a woman, who remains unidentified.

**Identification**: The woman said Lin's first message to her was an image of himself with a Hitler "filter" superimposed over his own face. A follow-up message described the photo as a "Composite of My Face with the Fuhrer."

Last Resort "I will stop at Nothing until you, your family, your friends, your entire WORTHLESS LATIN RACE IS RACIALLY EXTERMINATED,"

## **Pens Down Discussion**



# This is an active case. Names of involved parties have been redacted or changed

ase Study

Workplace w DV spillover

In the spring of 2018 I provided a workplace violence awareness course to a local company. Shortly afterwards a female employee approached HR.

The story she shared would devolve into one of the more involved non-fatal Workplace Violence/DV spillover cases I've worked.

Employee dated Adam for several years and separated with him about a year ago. During that time he has made several "weird visits" to the office.

The most serious incident happened about a month BEFORE the training course.

- March 28<sup>th</sup> He came into the office and started to harass me. He told me that he was going to kill me and that he was going to keep coming until he got me fired. I told him I was going to call the police but he said he didn't care. He finally left, but said he was going to be waiting for me.
- March 29<sup>th</sup> The next morning when I arrived at work Adam approached me outside the office. He had latex gloves on, a large hoodie with black jeans and was carrying a large kitchen knife. I took my phone out and started to call 911 but he knocked the phone out of my hand. He kept yelling at me and telling me I was going to die. I was only able to get away when a large white truck drove between us and I was able to run away into a coffee shop. I called the police and made a report.


• April 18<sup>th</sup> – When I was leaving for an assignment with a coworker Adam was standing across the street watching the office.


• April 25<sup>th</sup> – As I arrived at work at about 8:00, Adam was apparently hiding in the bushes near the office. As soon as got off the bus he charged at me at full speed. I was able to get into the office after my manger "buzzed" me into the building. He ran right up to the door but left after he saw two of my coworkers.


#### Good Morning

First thank you for speaking to me yesterday. I don't feel so helpless in thIs situation right now.

Also I think I might have left that police number in my desk at the office. But I did unblock yesterday and I have attached a few screen shots of his text to pass on to







I spoke to Hector and he really thinks based on the escalation of the text that you should file another police report. You can file the report online: <a href="https://www.cityofsacramento.org/Police/How-Do-I/File-a-Police-Report">https://www.cityofsacramento.org/Police/How-Do-I/File-a-Police-Report</a>

Once you have filed it, please forward me a copy so I can include it in the TRO with our attorney.

Also, we highly encourage you to contact WEAVE for additional support in the meantime. We are on our way to retrieve the police report from the March incident and will follow up with you once we receive it.

#### **Voicemail from POC**



#### Good morning,

came in this morning and provided more information. actually broke down in tears this morning, a side of her I haven't seen. She said it all hit her and she's completely in shock of how close she is to being seriously hurt or someone else in the workplace being hurt.

I've made several attempts to collect the report from the police department. I've followed their instructions and have walked in a notarized statement releasing us the report from The police department does not seem to take us seriously. I don't see them treating this as an urgent issue which is very alarming. We have calls into the office as well as Captain

	Case Number:
To the Res	spondent:
he court has issued the temporary orders checked as gra- rested and charged with a crime. You may have to go to oth.	
Personal Conduct Orders	
☐ Not Requested ☐ Denied Until the H	learing Granted as Follows:
a. You are ordered not do the following things to the enterprotected persons listed in 4:	
(1) Harass, molest, strike, assault (sexually or of sturb the peace of the person.	therwise), batter, abuse, destroy personal property of, or
(2) Commit acts of violence or make threats of	violence against the person.
(3) Fellow or stalk the person during work hour	s or to or from the place of work.
	tly, in any way, including, but not limited to, in person, by ail, by e-mail, by fax, or by other electronic means.
(5) Enter the workplace of the person.	8 '
	ss or locations. If this item is not checked, the court has
(7) Other (specify):	
Other personal conduct orders are attached	ed at the end of this Order on Attachment 6a(7).

Adam was charged with PC 422
PC 646.9 (A)
PC 417(A)(1)

Adam was convicted of PC 646.9(A) with a 2 year sentence Other charges were dismissed as part of the plea.

Employee approached HR and informed them that she just received a victims notification that Adam was set to be released this week.

Employee informed us that through a third party, Adam is going to make "everybody pay, anybody who had anything to do with him going to jail is going to pay."

Employer Reached out to Intake Probation Officer to share Concerns. Probation was very receptive.

## Adam Released from Custody under PCRS 8/27/19

(As of yet, he has not checked in with his Intake Probation Officer)

## Thoughts?

## Threat Assessment and Management



#### Considerations

# Structure Professional Judgment Instruments Actuarial Models Expert Judgement

The use of multiple tools combined with Expert Judgment supported by a structed process has been supported as a best practice.

#### **Assessment Tools and Instruments**

- Association of Threat Assessment Professionals V-RAGE
- The Workplace Assessment of Violence Risk-21, Version 3 WAVR-21
- The Historical Clinical Risk Management-20, Version 3 HCR -20
- Salem Keizer System, A Threat Assessment And Management Process For The Schools
- Secret Service –Threat Assessment is Schools Guide
- US Department of Education Threat Assessment in Schools
- Virginia Model Model for Student Threat Assessment
- National Association of School Psychologist Threat Assessment for School Administrators
- Los Angeles Unified School District Threat Assessment and Management
- Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (S.A.V.R.Y)
- Children's Aggressive Scale -Teachers Version (CAS-T)
- Gavin DeBecker JACA

#### Threat Assessment Team

The primary goal of this multidisciplinary team is to evaluate potentially threatening behavior, or actual incidents of violence within an organization and make recommendations on appropriate courses of action. The Threat Assessment Team is comprised of a small and very specific group of partners from across an organization. By leveraging each team members unique perspective, evaluations and associated recommendations are general more comprehensive.

Threat Assessments always start and often end with questions.

#### Uni-dimensional Assessments

"...the plague of the violence threat/risk assessment world."

They can occur when one person of any professional background such as mental health, law enforcement, or school administration chooses to interview the individual in question without validating the interview data, and without investigating history regarding past violence, suicide attempts, or other factors.



## Multi-Disciplinary Assessments



Groups of professionals from diverse disciplines, backgrounds and even proffesions to provide comprehensive assessment data and **contextual** variables.

### Six Principles of Threat Assessment

- 1. Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and often times discernible, process of thinking and behavior.
- 2. Targeted violence stems from an interaction between the individual, the situation, the setting, and the target.
- 3. An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful threat assessment.
- 4. Effective threat assessment is based upon facts rather than characteristics or traits.
- 5. Threat assessment is guided by an integrated **systems** approach.
- 6. The central question in a threat assessment inquiry is whether a person *poses* a threat, not whether a person *made* a threat.

Source: US Secret Service

## **Understanding Threats**

#### "There's something wrong here."

- *Direct* threat identifies a specific act against a specific target delivered in a straightforward, clear, and explicit manner.
- *Indirect* threat tends to be vague, unclear and ambiguous. Violence is implied, but threat is phrased tentatively, and suggests that a violent act *could* occur, not that it *will* occur.
- *Veiled* threat is one that strongly implies but does not explicitly threaten violence.
- *Conditional* threat is often seen in extortion cases. It warns that a violent act will happen unless certain demands or terms are met.

## Threat Assessment - Step by Step

Identify
Assess
Manage
Follow-up

## Step 1 - Identifying

#### The "Interviewer"

"An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful threat assessment." (Fein, et. al. 2002)

- thoughtful probing
- viewing information with healthy skepticism
- paying attention to key points regarding pre-attack behavior



## Step 1- Utilize External Resources

Family and Friends

Social Media

**Employee Assistance Programs** 

Domestic Violence Support Groups

Mental Health

**Social Services** 

**Specialized Consultants** 

## Step 2 - Assessing Threatening Behavior

**WHO -** Concerns should be evaluated by a multi-disciplinary team. No one person should make the decision.

**WHAT** - Does the individual pose a threat, not merely was a threat made?

**HOW** – Use a structured process such as Gavin De Becker's J.A.C.A



## STEP 2 - Assessing Threatening Behavior (cont.)

Gavin De Becker's L.A.C.A **Access/Ability Consequences Alternatives Justification** 

Are the concerns valid? (Continue or Suspend)

#### J.A.C.A - Justification

Does the individual have subjective justification? Or have they justified a reason that they should do the aggressive act?

• "I warned her what would happen and she did it anyway."

#### J.A.C.A - Alternatives

Do they have options other than acting out aggressively?

• i.e. "I am calling my lawyer and will have your job" vs. "No one can help now!"

The second is a much more threatening response.

## J.A.C.A - Consequences

Does the individual identify any rewards or negative consequences to being aggressive or violent?

• Examples of concerning responses would include "I can do jail time." or "I might get caught but it would feel good!"

#### J.A.C.A - Access

Does the individual have access/ability to carrying out the threat?

• We typically assume access is present. Just because we don't think they will actually build a nuclear bomb, they might Google search and find they have everything for a pipe bomb.


#### Level of Concern Determination

- 0 elements present no threat
- 1 element present mild threat
- 2 elements present moderate threat
- 3 elements present severe threat
- 4 elements present profound or imminent threat.



## Step 3 - Managing Threatening Behavior

Changes to the environment Intervention with the POC Intervention with the target



It's important to understand that we all tend to use the resources that we are the most comfortable with, even though they may not be the best solution for the problem.

## Step 4 – Follow- Up

Targeted Violence can occur days, weeks and even months after we think a threatening situation was resolved. We may need to orchestrate a method to monitor and/or intervene with regard to a threatening individual over time. That can mean making difficult decisions about how best to monitor and who (inside or outside the organization) should intervene.

## Closing Thoughts

## Questions?

Hector R Alvarez

halvarez@folsom.ca.us halvarez@wvpexperts.com

916-802-9177